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An expository paper that points out that there are two
long standing views on business cycles and economic dynamics
in general, one emphasizing endogenous stability plus
exogenous disturbances and the second endogenous instability
plus institutional containing or thwarting mechanisms. The
argument supports the endogenous instability perspective and
leads to an anti Laissez Faire Theorem and a Limitation Upon
Performance Theorem.2
1. Introduction
In this paper we argue that the current state of
economic theory as well as the performance of capitalist
economies in recent years support the view that the path
through time of a capitalist economy is best described as
the result of the interaction between the system's
endogenous dynamics, which if unconstrained would lead to
complex paths that include periods of apparent growth,
business cycles and economic instability, and the impact of
institutions and interventions which, if apt, constrain the
outcomes of capitalist market processes to viable or
acceptable outcomes. We call these institutions and
interventions "thwarting systemsVV.
We deviate from the conventions of orthodox economic
theory by assuming that in capitalist economies the core
decision makers are profit seeking businessmen and bankers.I
Even though their key actions are forward looking, these
agents are constrained by legacies of the past in the form
of capital assets and financial commitments. Furthermore
they do this within an institutional structure which they
know is changing even as they act. Every day the actions of
business men and bankers determine "tomorrow'sI capital
1. The conventional view is that "Any economic model is
going to have as its center a collection of hypothetical
consumers whose decisions, together with the technology and
market structure, determine the operating characteristics of
the system . ..I' (Lucas, 1987 p.20)3
asset and financial structure. In capitalist economies
yesterday and tomorrow are present today.
The agents' expectations of how the economy will perform
is one way tomorrow is present today. Each day contracts are
entered upon on the basis of tenuously held beliefs and
imprecise information: our bankers and businessmen act and
decide under conditions of uncertainty in the sense of
Keynes.: Because businessmen and their bankers have
liabilities the relevant uncertainty is mainly about future
profits (cash flows). The emphasis on businessmen and
bankers and on financial commitments and decisions based
upon expectations that respond to events (are endogenously
determined) and that are often tenuously held makes our
argument Keynesian.3 It is a Keynesian precept that the
performance of the economy affects the model of the economy
that agents use in forming expectations.4
Intertemporal linkages, financing, and the endogenous
determination of the model agents use in guiding the
formation of expectations mean that the appropriate
mathematical formulation of the economies we are
2. See Keynes'(1937) pp. 213-214.
3. It is a problem in the intellectual history of economics
to explain how Keynes's treatment of expectations formation
under conditions of uncertainty, which is central to an
understanding of the General Theory, disappeared from the
orthodox Keynesianism of the postwar period. (General
Theory, Ch. XII and XVII, and H.P.Minsky,l975)
4. In the rational expectations school's view the model of
the economy that guides agents behavior is invariant with
respect to unfolding economic experience.4
investigating will be complex time dependent systems. The
mathematics of such systems leads to the proposition that
capitalist economies should from time to time exhibit
economic instability.5 But instability rarely becomes
explosive. We need to understand why.
We use the ceiling-and-floor version of the accelerator-
multiplier interactions that were developed in the 1950's as
a simple prototype model which endogenously can generate
unsatisfactory states but which can be constrained by
interventions to generate satisfactory states. We postulate
that institutions and interventions thwart the instability
breeding dynamics that are natural to market economies by
interrupting the endogenous process and l'startinglt the
economy again with non market determined values as "initial
conditionsVt.6 It follows that the observed behavior of the
economy is not the result of market mechanisms in isolation
but is due to a combination of market behavior and the
ability of institutions, conventions and policy
5 We define dynamic instability in a rather informal way.
Essentially, we mean the irregular pattern and the
persistence in time of the most common macroeconomic
diseases, such as unemployment and inflation. This
instability can give rise to runaway situations such as deep
depressions or hyperinflation phenomena.
6. Central bank interventions, both as they affect money
market conditions and as a lender of last resort, which have
been in place over the centuries, are one form that
interventions and constraints take. The lender of last
resort function of central banks developed out of the
experience with intermittent endogenously determined
instability.5
interventions to contain and dominate the endogenous
economic reactions that breed instability if left alone.7
In section 2 we contrast the endogenous stability plus
shocks view of business cycles with the view based on
endogenous instability with thwarting or containing
mechanisms. In section 3 we consider how these two views of
the dynamics of the capitalist economy imply different
policy perspectives. In section 4 we take up examples of
thwarting forces within the endogenous instability view.
Section 5 states and interprets two theorems - an anti
laissez faire theorem and a limitation upon performance
theorem - that are implicit in the argument. The last
section is the conclusion.
2. Two Views on Dynamics
There have long been l'two viewstt of business cycle
dynamics: one is that the endogenous process of the economy
generates an equilibrium which may be static but now is
usually taken to be a "growth equilibrium@', and the other is
that endogenous processes lead to business cycles and
instability.8
7. This view harks back to H. P. Minsky's 1957 article.
8. In his memorial of Wesley Mitchell, Schumpeter
distinguishes between those economists who hold that II...
the economic process is essentially non oscillatory and that
the explanation of cyclical as well as other fluctuations
must be sought in particular circumstances (monetary or
other) which disturb that even flow." with the "...'theory
that the economic process itself is essentially wave like -6
The first view leaves business cycles to be explained.
In the work of Slutsky (1937) and Frisch (1933)- as well as
Friedman (1968) and Lucas(1972 ) -the economy is a mechanism
that transforms exogenous shocks, which are either random or
unanticipated policy interventions, into business cycles.
The important difference between Slutsky and Frisch on the
one hand and Friedman and Lucas on the other is that the
former explore the consequence of treating the economy as an
agent that averages shocks, whereas the latter accept the
economy as an averaging agent but ground their shocks in the
difficulty of maximizing agents to interpret changes in the
environment. In Friedman and Lucas the environmental changes
are initiated by money supply changes.'
The second tradition views business cycles- and economic
instability - as the natural and inherent consequence of
self interest motivated behavior in complex economies with
sophisticated financial institutions. The names in this
tradition are Marx, Mitchell, Schumpeter, Kalecki and
Keynes.
A llKeynesianl' endogenous explanation of business cycles
received a mathematical statement in the formalization of
that cycles are the form of capitalist evolution- . ..I@ (J.
A. Schumpeter (1951 ) page 252) Schumpeter held that
Mitchell, Keynes and he h>mself held the view that "..cycles
are inherent in the capitalist process."
9. Lucas concludes his 1976 paper by noting that II This
paper has been an attempt to resolve the paradox posed by
Gurley (1961) in his mild but accurate parody of Friedmanian
monetary theory: money is a veil, but when the veil
flutters, real output sputters." (Reprinted in Lucas (1981)
page 84.)7
the interaction of the accelerator and multiplier as a
second-order linear difference eguation.(Samuelson  1939). As
it could generate only four types of time paths (oscillatory
and damped, oscillatory and explosive, nonoscillatory and
damped and nonoscillatory and explosive) none of which would
do for business cycle analysis, this simple form was
unsatisfactory except as an expository device.
Starting with a Samuelson type multiplier-accelerator
interaction and assuming that the parameter values lead to
explosive (monotonic or cyclical) paths, Hicks (1950) added
ceilings and floors that had the effect of constraining the
economy to acceptable paths. This model was extended by
Minsky (1957,1959) who motivated the ceilings and floors by
referring to the behavior of monetary and financing
relations and interpreted the ceilings and floors as the
imposition of new initial conditions. lo This allowed the
endogenous dynamics to be such that unsatisfactory
performance would be generated by the unconstrained economy
even as the constrained behavior is acceptable. As policy
can be interpreted as the imposition of new initial
conditions in Minsky's formulation, policy can play a
positive role.
Interest in these models of endogenous cycles waned
after the 1950's: strong business cycles did not appear and
the rather steady growth made it plausible to assume that
10. For an interpretation of new initial conditions as
changes in regime, see Ferri and Greenberg (1989).the (moderate) fluctuations
8
of experience can best be
interpreted as transformations of stochastically or
systematically determined deviations from a growth path:
i.e. that the Frisch-Slutsky approach was valid. 11 In the
work of Lucas (1972, 1981, and 1987) and others, business
cycle analyses that claimed to be consistent with the
equilibrium- seeking and sustaining character of
microeconomic theory were advanced.
In more recent years the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system, serious recessions, and chilling episodes in
financial markets have cast doubt on the endogenous
stability of capitalist economies. At the same time
knowledge that simple deterministic nonlinear relations can
generate time series that are chaotic together with the
results of computer simulations which explored the
properties of mathematically intractable dynamic models
(Richard Day 1982, 1986) have shown economists that fully
endogenous economic processes can generate complex
patterns.12 These nonlinear models are not vulnerable to the
11. Richard Goodwin maintained an interest in endogenous
cycles throughout this period. See, for instance, Goodwin
(1967).
12 Chaotic behavior is defined as II . ..a time path that will
pass most tests for randomness'*. (Baumol and Benhabib, 1989
Pa 77) It can be generated by simple deterministic models.
'IIn essence, chaos theory shows that a simple relationship
that is deterministic but nonlinear, such as a first order
nonlinear equation, can yield an extremely complex time
path. Intertemporal behavior can acquire an appearance of
disturbance by random shocks and can undergo violent, abrupt
qualitative changes, either with the passage of time or with
small changes in the values of the parameters. (page 79)9
criticism that endogenous business cycle models generate
time series that are too regular. At the same time, these
series are not necessarily explosive. 13
3. Economic Theory and Laissez-faire
Adam Smith's invisible hand conjecture that each agent
II . . . intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end
which was no part of his intention" (Smith (1776) bk IV, ch.
2) is the foundation upon which exogenous shock models of
business cycles rest. The Smithian conjecture has been
transformed into the theorem that "A competitive
is a Pareto optimum.U8 The "invisible hand"
leads to laissez-faire as a policy position.l*




is a Pareto optimum theorem was achieved in the 1950's by
Arrow and Debreu (1954) and McKenzie (1959). This
achievement fulfilled only one part- the proof of the
13 It is worth stressing that modern analysis of nonlinear
models allows for the presence of instability which does not
necessarily degenerate into runaway situations. However, in
such models small changes in parameters can be responsible
for large changes in the dynamics. Thus, various innovations
that might change parameters might have the effect of
setting up entirely new dynamics such that people lose the
ability to interpret the future and this affects their
behavior. In this context, thwarting mechanisms try to
control the outcomes and keep them more stable.
14. The assumption underlying this view is that laissez-
faire does not unleash predators motivated by greed who
acquire and exploit market power, but that market conditions
force powerless agents to serve a "social good".10
existence of a competitive equilibrium- of the research
program of general equilibrium theory. The full research
program included the demonstration of the uniqueness and
stability of competitive equilibrium. It is now known that
the second and third part cannot be achieved: the
competitive equilibrium is not unique and it is not stable.
Even at the most abstract levels it is not possible to claim
that if left to its own device, a competitive economy would
achieve and sustain an equilibrium. I5
The formal model for which the existence theorem has
been demonstrated abstracts from innovations in technology,
institutions and policy interventions. There is no money as
liabilities of banks. The financing of investment in
resources that are expected to produce profits is not
considered. Arrow and Hahn (1971) cite Yeats, "The center
does hold" , when they briefly examine extensions of the
General Equilibrium model to Keynesian concerns.
Once the domain of what economists must explain is
broadened to include such economic activities as resource
creation, finance, innovation, market power and the creation
and modification of institutions, then the Adam Smith
proposition that each agent promotes "...an end which was no
part of his intention..." need include among the ends
promoted not only the effective working of markets, economic
15 The argument that claim of the power of the 'Walrasian
system of general equilibrium equations' made by many
economists goes beyond the proven properties of the
Walrasian system is to be found in Ingrao-Israel (1987),
Arrow-Hahn (1971) and Duffie- Sonnenschein (1989).11
progress and growth but also instability. Agents each
intending "...only his own gain..." contribute to market
relations that make a breakdown of the economy, such as
occurred over the years 1929-33, endogenous phenomena.
Technical change, innovations, capital assets,
institutional behavior, and ever evolving financing
relations are aspects of the economy that were ignored when
the theorem that competitive equilibrium exists and is an
optimum was derived. When these ignored elements are taken
into account the theory needs to link yesterday, today and
tomorrow. The models become complex, the problems even more
difficult to deal with, and the policy conclusions less
straightforward.
4. Thwarting Systems.
Once it is recognized that
of the economy are important
the endogenous interactions
elements in determining its
dynamical pattern, there is a need to explain why frequent
bouts of instability are not observed. The answer put forth
here is that the economy has evolved usages and
institutions, including agencies of government, whose
economic impact is to thwart the instability generating
tendencies of the economy. This is so especially when the
conjectural nature of the model of the economy that agents
use as they form the expectations that guide their behavior
is taken into account: the belief that "they wont let it12
happen" with regard to serious depressions is by itself
stability enhancing.16
The piece-wise linear model of business cycles based
upon ceilings and floors can be construed as a metaphor for
the interplay between market valuations and outcomes, on the
one hand, and the impact of the thwarting forces, on the
other. The ceiling and floor models as extended by Minsky
(1957, 1959) allow for policy determined variables - such as
the money supply or the governments budget deficit - to set




forces change in time.17 They differ among
The thwarting systems are analogous to
homeostatic mechanisms which may prevent a system from
exploding. However, they are not mechanical. Policy agents
and law makers need to interpret what is happening and need
to understand how their actions can affect the behavior of
endogenous agents and thus the economy. Peter Albin remarked
that "Agents in the model have a model of the model". Among
the agents who need to have a model of the model are policy
~~agentsl~. If the economy is endogenously unstable, then
policy based upon the assumption that the economy is
endogenously stable is likely to be inept.
16 We shall see below how this kind of attitutude can become
destabilizing in other situations.
17 Boyer and Mistral along with other French economists
write about ltregulationVV. See R. Boyer - J. Mistral (1984).13
A transitory semblance of stability can be achieved by
policy interventions and institutionally constrained
behavior. However, units learn how policies
affect the outcomes that result from their





The study of complex systems is incomplete without the
examination of specific thwarting systems. The theory tells
us what we have to look for: we have to look for customs,
institutions, or policy interventions that make observed
values of variables different from
have been if each economic agent
gain".
what the values would
pursued "only his own
Three examples from the US economy will be examined to
illustrate how institutional structures and systems of
interventions affect the behavior of the economy: the Piore-
Sabel conjecture with respect to labor markets, the uses of
market power, and lender of last resort interventions by
central bank mechanisms. These, of course, do not exhaust
the list of thwarting mechanisms.
a) Labor Market Institutions
Piore and Sabel (1985) argue that the United States post
World War II wage policy consensus was a significant factor
in creating the era of apparent tranquil progress that ruled
for the first two decades after World War II. The wage14
policy consensus was that hourly wages should increase each
year by a factor that reflected productivity gains plus
realized inflation - i.e. the purchasing power of wages was
to increase by about 3% each year. This consensus made for
tranquil progress because it held "underconsumption" in
check, which Piore and Sabel hold to be one of the causes of
serious depressions. Buoyant worker demand resulted from
this wage policy consensus. Piore and Sabel also suggested
that this trade union settlement forced the banking system
to be properly accommodating: the wage consensus dominated
the monetary mechanism.
Underlying the productivity plus inflation rule for
nominal wage changes was the view that competitive market
forces could not be depended upon to transform falling unit
labor costs into lower prices. If product markets were
competitive and money wages were constant then productivity
increases would be translated into falling money prices. The
argument for the post war settlement has to draw on a
proposition that market prices do not adjust to decreasing
unit labor costs or that if such adjustments took place
there would be adverse consequences.
In practice the wage consensus led to a rule that would
transform a shortfall of productivity increases into rising
product prices. If, for any reason, wage increases exceed
the rate given by productivity and inflation, then supply
conditions would make for further inflation. The consensus
rule assumed that if inflation takes place the banking15
system would be accommodative. This meant that llnextll year
the realized inflation plus productivity wage increase would
increase.
However, after a burst of wage increases in excess of
the productivity plus inflation rule in 1968-69 the wage
setting process became an engine of inflation. Escalator
clauses together with a banking system that accommodates the
demand for financing, either because of a consensus view of
what the banking system should do or because the authorities
feared unemployment more than inflation, tend to amplify the
dangers of inflationary instability. Thus, the rule of
monetary accomodation  which was stabilizing in one set of
circumstances, became destabilizing in another.
b) Market Power and Financial Structures
In our modern world successful production,
administration, communication, distribution and
transportation processes often use very expensive and long-
lived capital assets.18
Expensive, long-lived capital assets require financing.
In some capitalist economies - such as Italy - many of the
industries that require expensive, long-lived capital assets
are publicly owned and externally financed by means of debts
18. Often does not mean always. What has been called the
"Emilian WayI' can coexist with and prosper alongside
operations that require expensive capital because of
technology or the scale of operations. For a discussion of
this model, see Brusco (1982).16
of government agencies. In the United States almost all such
industries are private, and in many cases there are
alternative suppliers of the services or goods.
When J.P. Morgan was riding high it was discovered that
for such capital intensive industries as the railways,
intense competition, which forces price to marginal cost,
will not yield enough cash to validate bonds or the cost of
building the asset. This intense competition would result
either from "overinvestmenttt  in a regime of decentralized
markets for financing or from recessions that cut the demand
for the industry's output.
The banker's interest in business is that the cash flows
be large enough to validate the debts that were assumed to
pay for the capital assets when they were acquired. Such
debt validation and validation of prices paid for assets is
possible for production with constant or diminishing
marginal costs if and only if price exceeds marginal costs.
Intense competition, in periods of excess supply, must not
be allowed to push price to marginal cost. Bankers who take
seriously their responsibilities to the holders of
instruments they put out or sell will not finance
industries that require expensive capital assets unless
there is some believable guarantee that price will not fall
to marginal cost.
Such a guarantee can take two forms: one is to guarantee
that aggregate demand will be adequate, and the second is
for the owners of the capital to possess market power,17
either because of the non-competitive nature of the market
(monopoly, oligopoly) or because government regulates the
industry to prevent strong competition from emerging. Since
individual units, even Wall Street bankers, cannot guarantee
that aggregate demand will be adequate, bankers will
clients that possess market power.
Both monopoly and the regulation of industry
favor
that
constrains competition satisfy the need of bankers for
devices that limit the exposure of clients to downside
profit risks. The question is whether the financing
efficiency thus gained - which facilitates capital intensive
investment - offsets or fails to offset the allocational
inefficiency of non-competitive industries and regulated
monopolies. In Schumpeter's vision of accumulation and
innovation, technical dynamism requires that bankers and
businessmen cooperate in forcing the economy out of the path
that leads to simple reproduction. In the view that ignores
the processes by which accumulation is financed, regulation
and oligopoly lead only to allocational inefficiency.
The market power - whether through oligopoly or
regulation - solution to the problem of protecting lenders
against downside exposure loses some of its force when
fiscal and monetary intervention succeeds in maintaining
aggregate demand and aggregate profits. With demand
maintained and prices stabilized through the exercise of
market power by way of regulation or oligopolistic
interactions, profits are higher than anticipated even18
though unused market power can exist. As a result of the
unused market power, rising costs will not decrease profits
but will be translated into rising prices. If the problem is
formalized in terms of wage rounds and price rounds, a
situation in which the use of previously unused market power
becomes a basis for subsequent wage increases is brought
into being.
Prior to the import boom the American automobile and
steel industries were examples of shared monopolies in which
unused market power was translated into worker wages and
benefits. This led to a cost structure which became
untenable once trade undermined the product market monopoly.
The problem of how to meet competition that erodes market
power may require a reconsideration of the standard argument
for free trade . The institutional structure that emerged
when the issue was the financing of capital intensive
productions in a world where finance required protection
through market structures against aggregate demand failures
can be counterproductive in a world where such demand
failures do not occur and the monopoly power that supported
favorable wages is eroded.
c) Lender of Last Resort Intervention
Both monetarism and the orthodox Keynesianism that
ignores the historical period in which The General Theory
was written are alike in that they emphasize the Central
Bank as the creator of money rather than the Central Bank as19
the lender of last resort. In the 1990's, with the recent
experience of bank and thrift institution failures that have
led to a Government refinancing, it is not necessary to go
into any abstract discussion of a lender-of-last resort
intervention: we need only point
Argentina, Continental Illinois,
and Loan industry, etc.
The internal dynamics and
to what happened in Mexico,
Maryland, Ohio, the Savings
interactions with business
that needs to finance control over capital assets and with
households that prefer to hold indirect or protected assets
of our financial system lead to situations in which a
collapse of asset values and financing of activity, and
therefore of income and employment, seems likely. Over the
years the Central Banks have developed interventions which
do not permit realized values to represent the unconstrained
dynamics of the system. 1'
If there is any part of the economic
period in economic experience where overt
process and any
intervention is
accepted to prevent or dominate what market processes would
generate, it is when lender of last resort interventions
occur. Even though Central Banks and lender of last resort
interventions are common to capitalist economies, the
institutions and the form of the interventions vary. In
19 Irving Fisher's (1933) description of a debt deflation
process leads to the perception that central banks intervene
to short circuit the process and therefor to abort extreme
consequences.20
particular the existence of government 'Iholding companies"
mean that intervention in a country such as Italy is often
at the firm level, whereas in the United States the
intervention is almost always at the financial institution
level. (Chrysler and the Railroads of the Northeast are the
major exceptions.) Whereas interventions at the firm level
may not have any monetary policy implications,
interventions at the financial institution or financial
market level affect the reserve base of banks and the
interest rate structure. At times the Federal Reserve's
reactions to what it interpreted as an incipient financial
crisis led to both a refinancing of threatened organizations
and a significant easing in monetary policy.
5. Two Theorems
Two theorems which differ from accepted views emerge
from the proposition that the internal dynamics of a
capitalist economy will in time lead to unacceptable system
states . The first is an anti-laissez faire theorem and the
second is a tVlimitations  upon the attainable" theorem.
The Anti-Laissez theorem is that "In a world where the
internal dynamics imply instability , a semblance of
stability can be achieved or sustained by introducing
conventions, constraints and interventions into the
environment. The conventions imply that variables take on21
values other than those which market forces would have
generated: the constraints, and interventions impose new
initial conditions or affect parameters so that individual
and market behavior change".
The second, or limitation upon performance, theorem
follows from the first. If the pursuit of individual gains
or well being in the market leads the system to rush off
into inflation, deflation, or rapid oscillations, which
throw off signals that exceed computational capabilities,
then the economy will from time to time be moving rapidly
away from any reasonably defined notion of "allocationtt  or
"stabilizationl@ efficiency. If there is an observation lag
and less than perfect adjustment by interventions the system
can never be in an optimal allocation alignment. The theorem
that this implies is "The "practical best" for an economy
falls short of the abstract best."
There is a corollary to the limitation upon performance
theorem. Each agent maximizes within the system of
interventions and institutions that constrain the
performance of the economy to tolerable outcomes. To agents
for whom the constraints are binding, the attainable maxima
are deemed to be inferior to the unconstrained maximum.
Effective constraints imply that both the expectations
of gain and the objective possibilities of gain are smaller
than the agent believes they would be if the constraints
were removed. In the laissez-faire world each agent'smaximizing behavior is consistent with the




which we live each agent seeking only its own gain under
unconstrained conditions, i.e. maximizing with market
constraints as the only conditions, contributes to
instability. Intermittent instability, not order, results
from each agent behaving in the Smithian manner in an
unconstrained environment. Individualistic decision making
leads to instability in an unconstrained world, whereas
individualistic decision making leads to a tolerable outcome
if appropriate institutions and interventions are included.
As agents learn the effects of constraints,
institutions, and interventions, they will modify their
behavior, and this will in turn change the systemic effect
of the interventions. A system of intervention put in place
in one environment can be effective for a while, but as
agents acquire knowledge of how this system affects their
outcomes they will adapt their behavior, and this will
change the effectiveness of the interventions. The system of
intervention cannot be put in place once and for all. Policy
makers must be aware that there are always incentives to
evade and avoid the interventions, and they must adjust
their interventions accordingly.
These two theorems imply that any success in sustaining
stable growth depends upon the institutional structure.
Furthermore, because the institutional structure and the23
sources of instability change, due in part to the effects of
units seeking only their own gain, the success of any policy
structure will be transitory. "Revolutionst' such as
Roosevelt's in the 1930's or the "Age of Keynes" from 1946
to 1967 will lead to successful performance of the economy
even as the seeds of future failures are ripening as
structural relations, conventions, and institutions change.
There is no automatic pilot for an economy.
Because in each epoch the practical best falls short of
a theoretical best, there always seems room for improvement.
However, improvement takes on a variety of meanings in an
economy which both allocates given resources and uses
resources to create resources, in which technologies
embodied in capital assets are given even as agents strive
to change technology, and in which institutions and tastes
are themselves economic variables. Economists are given to
talking about efficiency, and in the models of the invisible
hand tradition, efficiency means allocative efficiency. But
in a dynamic view of the economy a variety of efficiencies
can be defined. Improvement in one "efficiencytt can lead to
a deterioration in another . All too often the "room for
improvementtt will be along IIone" of the efficiency
dimensions, but success may mean that one or more of the
others are compromised.
6. Some Conclusions.24
The endogenous instability view of the economy, in which
institutional structures and interventions stabilize the
unstable2' that we have developed, literally stands Lucas on
his head. Apt intervention and institutional structures are
necessary for market economies to be successful.
This view is consistent with history: laissez-faire
capitalist economies were failures almost everywhere in the
1930's, whereas the post World War 2 capitalist economies
that have been successful are big government interventionist
economies.
The emphasis in discussing policy must be upon IIapt@t.
The proposition that apt policy and institutions thwart the
endogenous development of instability does not mean either
that any policy regime will do the job or that there is a
unique effective policy regime. We can hazard the view that
a policy and institutional regime is more likely to be apt
if it reflects an understanding of what there is about the
economy that leads to unstable dynamics. We recognize, of
course, that there is no serious reason to believe that
those who developed the institutions and interventions that
make up the welfare state, which has enjoyed (transitory?)
successful in the post war period, had any deep
understanding of the potentially perverse dynamics of
capitalist economies. The political leadership and the
20. Minsky (1986) makes the same points without reference to
the mathematical properties of nonlinear systems and within
a specific model of profit generation in which profits are
determined by the structure of demand.25
public in the 1930's were skeptical of the claims that were
advanced for laissez-faire. Trial and error led to the
structure of interventions and institutions that survived.21
The statement that complex systems will from time to
time generate unstable movements through time is a
mathematical proposition. But mathematics is not economics.
Economists need to identify the economics that lead to
unstable dynamics. One aspect of the economy that may do
this is the way successful performance transforms market
power from a factor that facilitates investment to a factor
that supports inflation. The expectations
stability and regular growth of profits changes
role of market power.
induced by
the economic
The economics of the neo-classical synthesis accepted
that market economies were flawed in that there are no
adequate market processes to guarantee the achievement and
maintenance of a close approximation to full employment. 22
The political economy problem in the world after Thatcher
and Reagan is to recognize once again that the market way of
doing things is flawed not only in its ability to maintain
adequate aggregate demand but also as a device for assuring
21. The above is a myopic United States based view. In
Sweden, which had a particularity sophisticated cadre of
economists in the 1930's and a knowledgeable political
leadership in their Social Democratic Party, may have
knowingly introduced the welfare state.
22 For a discussion of these models, see Ferri and Minsky
(1989).26
productive investment and a tolerable distribution of
income.27
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